Publication | Page 618 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

Environmental Stresses and their Security Implications for South Asia July 2006 Uttam Kumar Sinha

In discussing the dynamics of contemporary conflicts, scholars, over the last decade, have focused on the ‘interconnectivity’ between environmental factors and violent conflict—for example between migration and environmental mismanagement, debt and violence and between ethnic conflict and resource disputes. Such an approach corresponds to the post-Cold War reexamination and redefinition of security in more comprehensive conceptual terms. Environmental cooperation is seen in this new environment as a non-threatening vehicle of engagement and a useful confidence building mechanism among states. One of the positive outcomes has been the growing legitimacy for military-to-military cooperation in environmental protection and the meaningful and practicable role militaries can play in overcoming some of the environmental challenges in South Asia.

Non-Traditional Security Environment, South Asia Japan's Security Concerns and Policy Responses July 2006 Arpita Mathur

Japanese foreign policy and security perceptions have undergone a perceptible and steady change over the past decade, especially under the leadership of former Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006). Its support for the US war on terror was a significant step in its growing international politico-security profile. Japan’s security perceptions in this period have been shaped by two distinct factors: hard security concerns that flow from the rising power and influence of China, and the uncertainties in the Korean Peninsula, especially in regard to the North Korean nuclear and missile programmes; and those that emerge from its quest for assured energy supplies from abroad and security of its large maritime interests as a trading nation. In the past five years it has sought an active international role to deal with its emerging security challenges, and a greater influence on global institutions that deal with security issues. Japan’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, the changing role of its Self-Defense Forces abroad, the ongoing
attempts to revise the Constitution, its active participation with the United States in the ballistic missile defence programme, and its search for new strategic partners in Southeast Asia and India –all indicate a fundamental shift in security policies and its emergence as a ‘normal state’.

East Asia Japan Nawab Bugti's Assassination: Future Portents July 2006 Alok Bansal

“I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty”,
-- Late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti1

As the insurgency in Balochistan drags into a long drawn out stalemate between the military regime and the Baloch nationalists, the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti has added an ominous dimension to it. Pakistani security forces killed Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the “Tiger of Balochistan” in an encounter in Kohlu district in the early hours of August 26, 2006. This is quite in line with Pakistan’s military ruler, Gen Musharraf’s desire to establish his writ by force in the province. He may have imagined that the best way to resolve the current crisis was to eliminate the recalcitrant Baloch sardars, who, the General thinks, are being supported by foreign powers to threaten the integrity of Pakistan. The ongoing army action in Balochistan also indicates that the military and not the civilian leadership is taking all the decisions regarding Balochistan. The disconnect between the military and civilian perceptions is quite stark when one analyses the killing of Nawab Bugti, particularly in the light of the statement made by Balochistan Governor Owais Ghani, just a few weeks earlier, that the government had no intention of harming Nawab Bugti as he was a respected figure and too old to be punished.2

Although a government-sponsored council reportedly attended by the Wader as (nobles) of all sub-clans of the Bugti tribe had disowned Nawab Bugti, on August 24, 2006, as the leader of the Bugti tribe and announced an end to the sardari system,3 the spontaneous popular reaction to his killing indicates that he had neither lost his aura nor his authority. The security establishment in Pakistan had been planning to remove Nawab Bugti from the political scene for quite some time. They had made an unsuccessful attempt in March 2005 by targeting his residential complex in Dera Bugti with as many as 17 shells.4 His hideout came under intense attack again, in July 2006, but he had survived both these attacks.

The tactics adopted by the Pakistani establishment to deal with the Baloch insurgency indicate that the military leadership is confident that it can resolve the issue by brute force.5 Many analysts and opposition leaders have, on the contrary, portrayed Bugti’s killing as a major threat to the federation and have foreseen a replay of the events that led to the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. In its report dated September 14, 2006, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has appealed to the international community to press Pakistani government to end all military action in Pakistan and to stop practices that violate human rights like torture, arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial killings.6

Although General Musharraf had initially “congratulated” the army on its success in eliminating Nawab Bugti, widespread criticism of the killing forced the regime to retract from this position. The original media reports had mentioned that satellite phone trackers were used to find the location of Nawab Bugti before the attack. There is absolutely no doubt about the fact that Nawab Bugti was the target even if a subsequent version issued by the ISPR on the night of August 26 claimed that it was an usual counter-insurgency operation and the area was targeted after an army helicopter came under fierce attack from the rebels while over-flying the region. The resultant battle led to the caving in of the mud bunker where he along with his men had taken shelter. The fact that over 20 elite commandos were killed by the rebels indicated that the rebels gave the security forces a tough fight before they capitulated.7 A white paper issued later by the government held Nawab Bugti responsible for the fighting that led to his death.8

According to yet another official version given out by the government four days after the killing, Bugti was not targeted by the military and the intention was to apprehend him alive but the cave, in which he was hiding, collapsed owing to a mysterious blast, just as military personnel were entering it. However, these shifting statements have only raised suspicions rather than clearing the air about the manner and circ*mstances of his killing. To add fuel to the fire, the government took five days to recover the body. This gave further impetus to the theories that he was not killed in the cave as the government claimed but in an encounter in the open, or in custody after being apprehended. There were rumours that the government wanted to use his dead body as a bargaining chip with his family, and even that chemical weapons had been used in the assault on the cave, which was why the government was reluctant to hand over the body. Even after the government flew his remains to Dera Bugti on September 1, 2006 the public was not allowed to have a look at the last remains of Nawab Bugti. His remains were buried in a locked and sealed coffin, opened only briefly to allow the maulvi leading the funeral to take a look.9

Nawab Bugti – A Chequered Career

The octogenarian Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, had epitomised the Baloch resistance to the military regime during the ongoing insurgency, especially since the clashes in January 2005 in Sui. His killing seems to have re-galvanised the Baloch nationalists. An alumnus of Aitchison College Lahore and Oxford, Nawab Bugti a relatively late entrant into the Baloch nationalist struggle. In fact, until he fell out with the establishment, he was rather considered a collaborator by the mainstream Baloch nationalists for his willingness to cooperate with Islamabad during the previous phases of the Baloch insurgency. He was also well-known for ruling his subjects with a firm hand, operating private jails and running a medieval feudal justice system in his area. Nawab Bugti is said to have committed his first murder when he was just twelve years old.10 A suave, articulate but arrogant feudal lord, who claimed complete sovereignty over his subjects, he held his nerves together in the midst of personal tragedies — he lost a number of his sons and grandsons to the assassin’s bullets. In spite these bereavements he remained an uncompromising feudal lord, who showed no mercy to his opponents.

He was the first and the only Baloch in the Pakistani cabinet (he held the home and then the defence portfolios) during the first decade of Pakistan’s existence and played an enigmatic and controversial role in most of the events in Balochistan. In the 1960s he took an active part in the opposition to the Pakistani government. In the 1970 elections, having been convicted for murder, he was barred from contesting the elections but contributed immensely in terms of his resources and finances towards the election campaign of the National Awami Party (NAP), led by Khan Wali Khan the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as Frontier Gandhi. However, his relationship with NAP leaders changed dramatically after they formed a government in Balochistan. Disappointed at not being named the governor, he turned against the party. Ultimately, it was his public testimony admitting that he had been involved with NAP leaders in a plot to create an independent Balochistan with the help of foreign arms (a claim strongly denied by Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, the Governor and Ataullah Mengal, the Chief Minister), that gave Bhutto the pretext to dismiss the NAP government in 1973.11

He was thereafter appointed as the governor of Balochistan to replace Bizenjo and during this period the guerrilla war against the government intensified. He resigned from the governorship on December 31, 1973 having served for ten months, the same length of time as the NAP had been in power. Despite his subsequent role in precipitating the guerrilla war in Baluchistan, he had not become a separatist and continued his demands for greater autonomy and more resources for Balochistan within Pakistan. By the late 1970s, Bugti, like Bizenjo and Mengal, was demanding a restructured Pakistan, that would give parity to the four provinces in a confederal rather than a federal structure. During the 1980s, in his characteristically provocative and idiosyncratic style, he made a personal protest against Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime by refusing to speak Urdu, Pakistan’s national language. He resumed speaking it only when elections were held in 1988.12

In the 1988 elections, he led the Baloch National Alliance (BNA), a coalition of tribal leaders and left-leaning nationalists and won a large bloc of seats in the provincial assembly. A coalition with the Jamiat Ulema-i- Islam brought the BNA to power and made him the chief minister. He held the post until 1990, when new elections were held. For the elections the Nawab established a new political party, the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), and continued to dominate politics (electoral and otherwise) in the Bugti area.13 Though he could not reclaim the post of chief minister, his party remained a force to be reckoned, with representatives in the provincial assembly as well as in both houses of the parliament. Bugti had been attempting to get all Baloch nationalist parties under one umbrella but his efforts were resisted by other Baloch Sardars who did not trust him due to his role in 1973.

Nawab Bugti turned out to be an aggressively defiant politician during the last years of his political life and could not develop a rapport with Musharraf after the latter seized power. He continued with his antigovernment resistance from Dera Bugti district, his traditional stronghold and the arena for most of the pitched battles fought between the security forces and Baloch nationalists. In early 2006, when he left Dera Bugti, riding a camel, in the company of a handful of his armed tribesmen for the mountains to fight the security forces, he knew that he would not be shown any mercy if he remained visible.

Impact of Assassination

Nawab Bugti’s assassination led to a spontaneous outbreak of violence across Balochistan and in other parts of Pakistan, wherever the Baloch reside in significant numbers. Quetta was the centre of intense protest. Protesters burnt vehicles, banks and petrol pumps and blocked roads. An indefinite curfew had to be clamped in the city. In Kalat, 150 km South of Quetta, a government building was bombed and a telephone exchange set afire. The Baloch nationalists ensured a total shutter down and wheel down strike throughout Balochistan on August 28, 2006. In Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan, riots erupted in all Baloch dominated areas.

The manner in which he met his death has given a huge fillip to the nationalist movement in Balochistan, which had hitherto been largely considered a “renegade movement” restricted to a few sardars and their followers. Furthermore, it has brought various tribes that had long been at loggerheads on to one platform. Even Raisani tribe, which has had a running feud with the Bugtis for over a decade in which several members of their families had been killed, has expressed solidarity with the Bugtis.14 Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, because of the circ*mstances and the manner of his death, is destined to become a martyr for Baloch nationalism like Nauroz Khan before him, and for all other nationalists fighting for autonomy or independence from Pakistan,15 despite the military regime’s repeated attempts to paint him as an autocratic feudal despot. Musharraf has not only erred in underestimating Baloch nationalism but has now earned the permanent enmity of a significant section of the Baloch population. In his death, Nawab Bugti has probably provided the fractured Baloch polity a rallying point. Ironically, his death may help achieve what he failed during his lifetime – the unity of the Baloch nationalist groups.

The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti is yet another case of a political assassination that will haunt Pakistani for a long time. It appears to be a case of terrible miscalculation and has weakened Musharraf’s position considerably. The killing has been criticised by almost all opposition political parties in Pakistan. What is more surprising is that many top leaders of the ruling party, including two former prime ministers, have termed the incident as unfortunate. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is a key constituent of the federal government as well as of the Sindh government, has squarely criticised the killing. Even a large number of retired army officers, hitherto close to the regime, have strongly criticised the government over the killing of Bugti.

The incident has triggered a furious reaction in Balochistan and added fuel to an already festering alienation. With the unrest refusing to die down in Balochistan and Baloch nationalist leaders submitting their resignations from the provincial and national legislatures,16some of the political leaders even from the ruling PML-Q have expressed their grief at Bugti’s death. PML-Q Secretary General Mushahid Hussain, for example, came out with a statement that the killing of Nawab Bugti was sad and unfortunate.17 But Hussain and other such ruling party leaders, who must have found the incident unwarranted, are political lightweights with no control over the military establishment, which is unaccountable to any civilian institution. Be that as it may, there is little doubt that this incident has greatly weakened the federation of Pakistan18 and consequently the standing of its all powerful president. Nawab Bugti’s death will only strengthen the Baloch nationalists’ belief in the futility of negotiating for their rights within the federation.19

Conclusion

The circ*mstances under which Akbar Bugti attained martyrdom continue to remain shrouded in mystery, while a number of government spokespersons churn out newer and often contradictory versions of his death,20 thereby indicating the troubled mind of a troubled regime. By eliminating a political leader of Bugti’s stature, the military government has unwittingly strengthened the ranks of the militants in Balochistan. The insurgency is not likely to recede, nor will Islamabad manage to dampen Baloch anger in the foreseeable future.21 Several people including many innocent Punjabis residing in Balochistan have been killed in the violent protests that have not remained confined to Balochistan only. This raises serious questions about the stability of the country and the future of the federation.

The current insurgency in Balochistan underlines the fragility of the Pakistani State more than 58 years after its creation. If violence in Balochistan intensifies, the Pakistani army will gradually be sucked into a war that will fester and bleed Pakistan. The military leadership seems to have learnt no lesson from history and the events of 1971, which ultimately led to the disintegration of the country.22According to Karachi-based businessman Fakir S Ayazuddin, the policy-makers in Islamabad would be well advised to read the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report which points to the mindset that led to the loss of half of the country.23

Over the years, the perception that they are being exploited has steadily grown amongst most of the Baloch population. There is no doubt that the province is not adequately compensated for its natural resources that have been crucial for the development of Pakistan.24 The issues bedevilling Pakistan today are fundamentally the same ones that visited Pakistan in 1971. The Baloch forces may be weaker and fragmented but the underlying grievances are the same as then. The Pakistani army believes that defeating the dissidents this time round would be easier in the absence of a hostile neighbour to provide arms and shelter. This complacency could prove to be a costly mistake.25 Pakistan with the mindset of a colonial power has been using force and coercion to browbeat the Baloch into submission, but the Pakistani Army, with 70,000 troops in Waziristan and six brigades deployed in Balochistan, is already overstretched.26 Moreover many of the other ethnic minorities are coming out in support of the Baloch.

According to an editorial in the weekly Newsline, “Crushing the rebellion (as opposed to quelling the riots) will not be an easy task, as the Baloch are not alone in their struggle. Apart from gaining moral support within the country, they are reportedly acquiring material support from external sources.”27 In fact, an independent Balochistan is being seen as a future reality by some US experts already. A paper recently published in the US Armed Forces Journal not only recommends redrawing the borders of the Middle East but also speaks of an independent Balochistan.28 The future course would depend on whether the Pakistani Army would step back and implement the recommendations on Balochistan made by the high profile parliamentary committee in 2005, or choose confrontation and set the country on a disastrous course.29

References/End Notes

1. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, New Delhi, Penguin Books India, 2002, p 109.
2. “Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan”, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 119, September 14, 2006, p 23.
3. “Dera Bugti jirga ‘ends sardari system’”, Dawn, Karachi, August 25, 2006.
4. Shahzada Zulfiqar, “War without End”, News line, Karachi, April 2005, p 45.
5. Alok Bansal, “Nawab Bugti’s Assassination”, at http://www.idsa.in/publications/ stratcomments/AlokBansal290806.htm (Accessed on September 15, 2006).
6. no. 2, p iii.
7. Alok Bansal, “Balochistan after Bugti”, at http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/aug/ 28guest1.htm (Accessed on September 16, 2006)
8. Zahid Hussain, “The End Game”, Newsline, September 2006.
9. Nirupama Subramanian, “Balochistan Blaze”, Frontline Volume 23 ( 18) September 9-23, 2006, p 114.
10. Sylvia A Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997, p 1.
11. Paul Titus in Introduction to Sylvia Matheson’ book The Tigers of Baluchistan, published by Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997, p xvii.
12. Ibid, pp xvii-xviii.
13. Ibid, pp xviii-xix.
14. Massoud Ansari, “The Battle of Balochistan”, Newsline, September 2006.
15. Ahmed Rashid, “Rebel killing raises stakes in Pakistan”, from BBC Website http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5290966.stm (Accessed on September 16, 2006).
16. Malik Siraj Akbar, “BNP-Mengal quits assemblies”, Daily Times, September 4, 2006.
17. He reportedly stated: “He was a friend and a prominent political figure. His death, and the manner of it, is sad and unfortunate” cited in “Mushahid grieves over the death of ‘a friend’”, Daily Times, August 28, 2006.
18. no.2 p 27.
19. Farhatullah Babar, “Vanquished but not defeated”, The News, September 4, 2006.
20. Editor’s Note, Newsline, September 2006.
21. no.2, pp 26-27.
22. Zahid Hussain, no.8
23. Fakir S Ayazuddin, “The Balochistan Imbroglio”, The International News, Islamabad, Internet Edition, January 25, 2005.
24. Ibid
25. Kunwar Idris, “Is the federation at risk?”, The Dawn, Karachi, January 8, 2006.
26. Farrukh Saleem, “Balochistan: an objective assessment”, The International News, Internet Edition, January 22, 2006.
27. no. 20.
28. Ralph Peters, “Blood Borders”, US Armed Forces Journal, June 2006, at http:// www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899 (Accessed on September 17, 2006).
29. no. 20.

South Asia Balochistan, Pakistan Terror Trends: Mega Cities, Maximum Impact July 2006 T. Khurshchev Singh

The security environment of India is in a critical phase, repeatedly challenged by terrorism, with outfits operating out of Pakistan continuing to be highly active and finding new and unexpected targets. Trend analyses over the years indicate that the targets, motives and operatives have changed. Terrorist attacks are no more targeted mainly at security forces and government establishments, but have expanded to include strikes against India’s economic and strategic assets.

The metropolis has become the prime terror target – a trend noticeable around the world. Terror attacks on big cities with its identifiable landmarks, its heterogenous mix of citizens make the maximum public and media impact. As 9/11 showed, they create a visual spectacle that gets engraved in public memory. City- based media and 24x7 news channels ensure immediate coverage. For terrorists, terror after all needs to be watched and the resultant chaos and panic is a measurement of the success of their acts. From New York to Madrid to London and Mumbai, urban terror has become a major trend – bigger the city, greater the fallout. A new pattern of attacks on commuter and mass transport system has also emerged. In March 2004, Madrid’s train network was hit by a series of explosions at the rush hour. In all 191 people were killed and over 1700 wounded. In July 2005, a series of coordinated bomb blasts struck London’s underground rail during the morning rush hour, killing 38 people. The Mumbai serial blasts on July 11, 2006 (7/11) followed similar pattern except that the ‘rush-hour’ in this case was in the evening. Terror follows a path and tends to repeat itself. The 1993 Bombay serial bomb blasts that targeted the Stock Exchange and other busy areas such as markets killing 257 people, the Sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway in March 1995 that left 565 people hospitalized, and the initial attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 1993 had already set the benchmark for urban terror.

In the past few years, India has witnessed a series of terrorist attacks on its major cities, including the 7/11 Mumbai serial blasts. In Delhi, some of the major attacks were the May 22, 2005 blast in two cinema halls, the October 29 serial blasts and the twin blasts at Jama Masjid on April 14, 2006. Subsequently, there was an attack on the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore. Since 2005, 273 people have been killed, including five terrorists and 268 civilians, and many more injured and properties wrecked in such attacks on the Indian metropolises .1

In the following segment we look at the nature of the recent spate of terrorist attacks in some of the mega cities in India, including the tactics being employed by the terrorists and the counter-measures of the state.

Mumbai

The 7/11 serial blasts in the suburban trains in Mumbai, which left 200 dead and 700 injured, was the deadliest terrorist attack in India in recent years. Earlier on August 25, 2003 twin blasts at the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazar caused 50 deaths and injured 150 civilians. The 7/11 attack were well planned, coordinated and engineered between 6.24 pm and 6.35 pm during peak-hour when office-goers were returning home. It was clearly intended to create panic in India’s financial capital (Mumbai) with resulting cascading effect on the economy.

Delhi

Since 1997, Delhi has witnessed 26 major bomb blasts killing in all 92 people and injuring more than 600.6 Among the incidents, the 10/29 (2005) blasts, was the most serious – killing 62 persons and injuring 155. The explosion occurred almost simultaneously at two busy market places in Delhi and one in a Delhi Transport Cooperation bus. This was the first high-intensity incident since the December 13, 2001 attack on the Parliament in which 11 were killed and 30 injured. Investigators later found the attack was jointly executed by the Pakistan-based LeT and JeM.7 In another incident on May 22, 2005 the twin blast at Liberty and Satyam Cinema injured at least 70 persons and killed one. It was triggered by the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) in protest against the movie, Jo Bole So Nihaal (a Sikh war cry) meaning, “Blessed is the one”.8 Subsequently, 13 people were injured in two low-intensity explosions that took place inside the Jama Masjid when the devout were offering prayers on April 14, 2006.

On March 5, 2005 three LeT terrorist were killed in South West Delhi. Two Jaish-e-Mohammed, four Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and 17 BKI were arrested in the same year. Subsequently, three prominent LeT members were also arrested, including Abu Razak Masood who is reported to be the outfit’s coordinator in Dubai. In the following year (2006), eight LeT members and five BKI operatives were arrested from different places within the city. In addition, two suspected LeT terrorists were killed in encounter with the police in the Northwest of the city. With the help of intelligence, Delhi police had also seized illegal arms and ammunition like RDX, timers, detonators, rifles, rounds of ammunition, etc., from different terrorist hideouts.

Bangalore

The terrorist attack in the IISc campus in Bangalore on December 28, 2005 points to a departure from the earlier terrorist approach of targeting security forces personnel and common civilians. In this case, scientists and scholars were the targets. The attack took place in the middle of an International Conference organized by the Operational Research Society of India. A professor was killed and five persons were injured when an unidentified gunman opened fire and lobbed grenades in the IISc campus.9 The attack, as later revealed, was carried out by a LeT member, who was also the outfit’s south Indian commander, Abdul Rehman. He was subsequently arrested.10 The terrorist motive in this case was to target the Indian IT industry and instill fear in the scientific community and research institutes.

Analysis

The quantity of illegal arms and explosives seized from the different centres and groups indicate that terrorists are sufficiently equipped to strike terror in big cities. The targets have also been expanded to important strategic locations. The National Security Advisor M K Narayanan stated on July 28, 2006 that there was a serious threat from the LeT to nuclear installations in the country.11 Consequently, security has been tightened at the Kaiga nuclear power plant in Karnataka as well as at Kalpakkam. In fact, LeT’s plan to blast reservoirs and power installation in Karnataka was revealed when a terrorist (Habeeb from Almatti, Bagalkot district) was arrested on January 15, 2006.12 On March 6, last year a Delhi-based LeT cell was eliminated that hatched a plot to attack a series of IT centres of India in connivance with the banned SIMI.13 All these indicate an expanding terrorist network in the southern part of the country and the targeting of the symbols of ‘emerging India’ – the IT sector, scientific establishments and nuclear power plants. The arrested terrorists were also planning to attack the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun.

The LeT groups with their wide network have considerable presence in most of the metropolis. Recently, on February 1, 2006, a LeT module was busted in Kolkata and plans of a possible strike in the metropolis were uncovered.14 Unlike the security forces, bustling cities with its on-the-move populace are easy targets. Since the LeT’s network in India is widely spread; future targets are possible in places like Information Technology (IT) hubs, Business Processing Organisations (BPO), in particular the Call Centres, tourist centres, hotels, market areas or shopping malls, and places of worship. Hence IT firms in Bangalore, Hyderabad, Cochin, Chennai, Coimbatore, Gurgaon and Pune have to be taken as high security risk zones.15 Also, BPOs in metropolises need more safeguards against threats such cyber crime. In fact, in the last few years, the security agencies have lodged several cases under the IT Act 2000 and Indian Penal code provisions.16

Trend analysis also reveals that terrorist outfits like the LeT and JeM create bogus (new) groups to hide their real identity after an attack. After 7/11 a claim was on e-mail by a new group with links to the LeT called Lashkar-e-Qahar. After the October 2005 Delhi serial blasts, a hitherto unknown outfit, Inquilabi (Revolutionary) Group claimed responsibility and warned of more such attacks in future unless India stopped its “oppressive and hideous measures” in J&K.17 Arrests and investigations by the Delhi Police, however, revealed that the terrorists involved in the attack were none other than members of LeT. Similarly, in the Varanasi terrorist attack case on January 7, 2006, the JeM attempted to throw sleuths off their trail by putting up a fictitious group, Lashkar-e-Qaharby to claim responsibility of the bomb blast at a railway station.18

It has been claimed that the Mumbai serial blasts was direct fallout of the Gujarat riots in 2002.19 Interestingly, the majority victims of any urban terror are non-Muslim civilians. In contrast, the twin blasts of Jama Masjid were low intensity resulting in a few injured. The Jama Masjid incident clearly outlines the terrorist outfits’ design to stoke communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims and not target the Muslims per se. Not surprisingly, the second blast occurred 15 minutes after the first by when all the devout had been evacuated.

Metro terror has become an exclusive domain of terrorists of Islamic identity such as the LeT and JeM. Insurgents from the Northeast or the left-wing extremists such as the Naxalites rarely operate in or attack metropolitan centres. Intelligence agencies will be increasingly challenged to trace the local support bases without which urban terror cannot exist. 20 It is clear that terrorist organizations are recruiting disgruntled urban youth and with the support of groups such as the SIMI are expanding their networks and operations. A large influx of migrants from Bangladesh to metros in India is also of concern and needs to be checked and closely monitored. Head hunting of terrorists may not succeed in curbing terror in metros. Indeed, the state apparatus needs to educate the local populations about terrorism and way it is being carried out while simultaneously enhancing intelligence on their activities. Cities also urgently need to invest in redesigning market places, transport hubs, housing estates, and major institutions with security in focus.

References/End Notes

1. Data basically calculated from casualties provided by various open sources especially www.satp.org
2. “LeT, JeM, SIMI Helped Put Plan Into Action”, October 1, 2006.
3. “2 LeT men arrested in J&K”, The Times of India, August 28, 2006.
4. “Police search for SIMI man”. The Times of India, October 1, 2006.
5. “Mumbai blasts LeT handiwork”. The Times of India, August 24, 2006.
6. Data calculated from the figure provided at “Bomb Blasts in Delhi, 1997-2005”, at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/delhi_blast.htm.
7. See “Press Release on December 18, 2001, statement made by Honerable Home Minister L K Advani at http://www.hciottawa.ca/news/pr/pr-011218.html
8. See “Jo Bole So Nihaal”, at http://www.answers.com/topic/jo-bole-so-nihaal.
9. “Scientist killed as gunman opens fire in Bangalore”, http://www.hindu.com/ 2005/12/29/stories/2005122919810100.htm.
10. “LeT operative arrested in Bangalore for IISc attack”, at http://in.rediff.com/ news/2006/jan/03bang.htm
11. “India Timeline-Year 2006”, at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/ timeline/index.html
12. Ibid
13. Sudhir Saxena, “The Rise of Fiscal Terror”, at http://idsa.in/publications/ stratcomments/sudhirsaxena250305.htm.
14. “Police bust Lashkar module in Kolkata”. The Times of India, February 2, 2006.
15. See “Pune’s booming IT parks sector”, at http://www.ibef.org artdisplay. aspx?cat_ id=194&art_id=12036
16. “ Unknown militant group claims for Delhi blasts”, BBC, October 31, 2005.
17. “ Unknown militant group claims for Delhi blasts”, BBC, October 31, 2005.
18. See “Jaish creates Qahar: Cop See Through Terror Group’s Red Herring”, The Times of India, March 10, 2006.
19. See “AGujarati Connection”, at http://www.sepiamutiny.com/sepia/archives/ 003571.html.
20. “Terrorist helped by locals”, The Times of India, January 26, 2006.

Terrorism & Internal Security Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Trend Analysis, Terrorism The Essence of the South Asian Nuclear Debate July 2006 Namrata Goswami

Scott D. Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed With New Sections on India and Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defence (New York: W W Norton and Company, 2003).

Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s National Security (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006).

Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry India- Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Rajesh Rajgopalan, Second Strike Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia (New Delhi: Penguin, Viking, 2005).

Nuclear weapons burst into the world arena in 1945, with the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The destruction was so near total that Japanese folklore and music ever since are replete with plays and songs of those two fatal days in the summer of 1945. The American guilt for engineering such unwarranted killings has been no less either. Ever since nuclear weapons have dominated the discourse on strategic studies, starting with the well known publication of Bernard Brodie’s much acclaimed book Absolute Weapon in 1946, scholars have been investigating various aspects of the subject from different perspectives, especially from the point of view of deterrence theory. Most of the literature on deterrence can be broadly categorised into two schools of thought: deterrence optimist school and the pessimist school. The scholars belonging to the first school broadly believe that nuclear deterrence works across cultures and different political systems. They argue that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more states does not necessarily destabilise the international order and may even create conditions for a more peaceful world. The scholars who subscribe to the second school, however, emphasise the important differences in the technological conditions, political and organisational cultures of the states. These variations, they feel could either impede or enhance deterrence stability. Given the anarchic nature of world politics and the uncertainties that are prevalent in the inter-state relations, the emergence of the powerful non-state actors embracing messianic ideologies, it is a prudent policy to restrain, dissuade, contain and prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons by new states. Kenneth Waltz, a leading theorist of international relations belongs to the first school. Scott D. Sagan is the principal proponent of the second school. In what can be termed as the most illuminating scholarly dialogue, these two scholars have put together their arguments in the book under review – The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The nuclear weapons optimist position flows from the logic of rational deterrence theory. This theory indicates that the possession of nuclear weapons by two states reduces the likelihood of war between them primarily because the costs of war and its consequences are immense. Basing his arguments within the neorealist structural theory, Waltz indicates that systemic pressures disable any two nuclear weapons state from deviating from the point of logical decision making; that nuclear weapons are primarily a tool of deterrence and their existence is a stabilising factor in international politics. He strongly advocates the view that more new nuclear weapons states would actually lead to greater stability on a systemic level. He is, however, not alone in making such argumentations. Bruce de Mesquita, Peter Lavoy and John Measheimer equally believe that “nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent”.1 Sagan, on the other hand, strongly asserts that such an optimistic view of nuclear weapons is dangerous for the world. Placing his arguments within the theoretical underpinning of organisational theory, he argues that military organisations in nuclear weapons states suffer from certain common biases: inflexible routines and parochial interests. Such behavioural patterns, swaying on the side of inflexibility, could lead to the breakdown of deterrence and trigger off a major nuclear exchange with catastrophic consequences. Differing with Sagan’s position and projecting a positive future for nuclear deterrence, Basrur in Minimum Deterrence and India’s National Security, Ganguly and Hagerty in Fearful Symmetry, and Rajgopalan in Second Strike Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia supports the Waltzian position that nuclear weapons have acted as a deterrent in the India-Pakistan context. The dominant view emanating from their writings is that the rhetoric of threat between the two countries is nothing more than mere rhetoric to deter the other from considering the nuclear option.2 The two states might experience a sense of desperation because of their vulnerability to conventional attack but in crisis situations, both countries have exhibited a greater sense of desperation to avoid the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Sagan refutes this position by claiming that states like India and more importantly, Pakistan lacks institutional mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision making. Military organisations are also “inward looking”, heavily influenced by domestic politics and therefore, decisions regarding nuclear weapons would be taken based on issues of domestic stability, rather than systemic threats.

Before dwelling further, the reviewer would like to make it clear that there is a conceptual difference between nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. The two concepts are not to be mixed together. Conventional deterrence depends on the quality, quantity and strength of conventional forces that a country possesses. Such forces could be utilized either for an offensive or defensive posture. Countries also could strike first in a conventional sense to gain the advantage as the costs and consequences of such strikes are limited. Nuclear deterrence is achieved through its ability to punish a country with a high rate of “unacceptable costs”. In the words of Waltz, “dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but because the expected reaction of the opponent may result in one’s own severe punishment”.3 Deterrence is primarily achieved through the certainty of retaliatory punishment and the uncertainty of a state’s nuclear policy in times of crisis. For such a retaliatory strategy, the survivability of nuclear weapons from a first strike; a second strike nuclear force is crucial. The reviewer also is of the opinion that though conventional wars can be fought in a nuclear environment, yet higher the stakes in the war, the greater the risk of nuclear retaliation. As a result, nuclear weapons negate both conventional and nuclear advantage. History has also proved that in a conventional world, wars spiral out of control and could be limitless, whereas in a nuclear world, only limited wars could be fought.

Nuclear weapons in the South Asian context have given rise to numerous speculations about their probable use in war. The chief western concern is that India and Pakistan have a history of wars; they had a bloody partition, and both states are inherently hostile towards the other’s existence. Given the emotional volatility of their relations and the geographical proximity of their borders, both countries could be engaged in a devastating nuclear arms race, strike each other with nuclear weapons with unimaginable consequences and come to oversee their mutual destruction. Sagan refutes the efficacy of rational deterrence theory in this context, elaborating that actors’ rationality in a nuclear environment is an assumption, not backed by evidence. He cites that though India has an extremely assertive civilian nuclear command structure, the Pakistan military is in complete control of its nuclear weapons. Both sides have a history of misunderstanding, have engaged in four wars in the past, and a violent dispute over Kashmir. They have also shared pre-colonial, colonial and common cultural traits. Such a situation contrast sharply with the American-Soviet nuclear balance during the Cold War. These two countries did not have any territorial dispute and hardly knew each other in cultural terms. Though admitting that the new nuclear powers would not repeat the mistakes of the Cold War adversaries, Sagan argues that the India- Pakistan historical rivalry, protracted ideological and territorial disputes may drive them up the nuclear ladder during a crisis. This might happen either willfully, accidentally or by miscalculation.

The books under review can be placed in three thematic categories. These are essentially the three conditions of deterrence stability that have been identified by the scholars. By placing each author’s arguments within the intellectual boundaries of the requirements set out, the review would attempt to delineate the trend of the debate in the South Asian context. The review would end by providing the final thoughts on the issue and the dominant trend that emerges in the argumentation of the four reviewed books.

The three important requirements of nuclear stability are:

Prevention of preventive war.
Survivable second strike forces.
Avoidance of accidental nuclear war.

Prevention of Preventive War

Sagan writes that both India and Pakistan have raised the nuclear antenna on a number of occasions and have led the South Asian region to the brink of a nuclear disaster. As India was the first to test nuclear in 1974, Pakistan military leaders did not get the chance to contemplate a preventive strike. The crucial aspect of a strike arises on account of the small size of the India-Pakistan nuclear arsenal. Given that these nuclear weapons are smaller and less sophisticated than were the US and Soviet arsenal, renders them vulnerable to a counterforce attack and less capable of mounting a counterforce attack. Hence, the certainty of a second strike on which the entire logic of deterrence rests is thrown off gear. He posits that during Brasstacks (1986-87) India undertook a massive military exercise involving 250,000 troops and 1, 500 tanks along the India Pakistan border in Rajasthan. The rationale behind the exercise, according to Sagan, was a covert plot on the part of the then Indian Chief of the Army Staff, General K. Sunderji to provoke a Pakistan military response and subsequently, the Indian air force could strike Pakistan’s nuclear programme. For Sagan, the Indian failure to notify Pakistan about the nature of military buildup betrays the hidden motives that animated the military and political leadership. The 1990 Kashmir crisis and the Kargil conflict of 1999, Sagan believes, exemplify the unstable nature of strategic interactions in the region. He argues that Kargil demonstrated the organisational bias of the Pakistani Army, typically rooted in short term tactical maneuvers rather than anticipate the strategic consequences of such a conflict. As a result, Pakistan military completely overlooked the likely international reaction; Pakistan was diplomatically isolated during Kargil. Also the Kargil conflict demonstrated the stability/instability paradox; stability in the nuclear level did not deter wars at the conventional level. The nuclear rhetoric employed by both India and Pakistan during Operation Parakram, the pessimists argue, demonstrate the fragility of escalation control mechanisms. See Waltz and Sagan, no. 1, pp. 88-124.

Waltz differs with Sagan. He contends that the alarmist views about the South Asian nuclear situation are at best, imperialist and tend to look at the South Asian decision makers as lesser breeds possessing lower levels of rational conduct.4 According to Waltz, nuclear arms race is neither inevitable nor are there any signs of it being visible in the present South Asian landscape. In his assessment, both India and Pakistan are likely to contain their nuclear arsenal to the requirements of a credible second strike. Approvingly citing Subrahmanyam’s arguments, Waltz claims that Indians have understood well that building large nuclear forces are a waste of resources and foolhardy. An arsenal of sixty for India and twenty for Pakistan would be sufficient for the purposes of deterrence. The chief purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is to deter India’s superior conventional capabilities not their use as weapons of coercion. Rajgopalan, agrees with Waltz and suggests that India should not give undue importance to Pakistan’s refusal to subscribe to the ‘no first use’ doctrine and its easy resort to nuclear rhetoric during the crisis situations. These are essentially aimed at deterring India’s overwhelming conventional superiority.5 When it comes to actual crisis between the two sides, it is clear that central control tightens over nuclear weapons reducing the possibility of a nuclear crisis. He argues that both the Pakistan and Indian nuclear strategies are extremely cautious and are meant primarily to deter the other. Rajgopalan describes three types of deterrence. Deterrence by punishment involving a threat of unacceptable damage in retaliation (massive) which Robert McNamara described as “Assured Destruction”; deterrence by denial which anticipates that in an event of failure of deterrence, strategic defensive forces, offensive forces, and command and control capacity come into play; and existential deterrence, a concept suggested by McGeorge Bundy, who argued during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 that the existence of thermonuclear weapons were enough to deter both the US and Soviet Union. Relative balance of numbers (how many warheads), did not matter in the ultimate analyses for the decision makers. In the South Asian context, the idea of existential deterrence with a small survivable nuclear arsenal would prevail.6 So far as the temptations of preventive attack, both Waltz and Rajgopalan are of the opinion that it is an unlikely possibility in the South Asian context. Rajgopalan asserts that Indian nuclear doctrine falls within the parameters of existential deterrence. With regard to Kargil and Operation Parakram, though both crises were clearly conventional in nature, the threat of nuclear weapons usability loomed large on the horizon. Significantly, nuclear signaling was limited in both crises. The claims that India was deterred from crossing the Line of Control (LoC) because of the existence of nuclear weapons could be partially true. However, it is also equally true that the Indian decision not to cross the LoC was also informed by the diplomatic advantages of not crossing the LoC. The positive role of the Clinton administration in diffusing the crisis can not be discounted. While it is tempting to credit Indian restraint to nuclear deterrence alone, one should not underestimate the image of war held by Indian political leaders. The belief that India could win the war without having to escalate perhaps played no small part in the Indian calculations.

Parakram was more a strategy of compellence rather than deterrence. Nuclear signaling with regard to missile tests was conducted by both sides. Though the idea of a preventive strike across the border was contemplated by India on terrorist camps, it was given up on the face of intense international pressure and the existence of nuclear arsenal in Pakistan. After the Kaluchak attack on May 14, 2002, Pakistan conducted missile tests, perhaps intended to deter Indian conventional forces from embarking on a military venture across the International Border or LoC. However, actual behaviour suggests that the leaders on both sides were careful with regard to nuclear threat rhetoric. Basrur is also of the view that India’s history and strategic culture, its doctrinal policy clearly reflects the strategic choice of a “credible minimum deterrent”. His work is an attempt to fulfill the lack of conceptual clarity in the minimalist nuclear posture. For him, minimal deterrence “threatens the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible”.7 According to Basrur, the ability of the nuclear weapons to deter is dependent on the adversary’s perception of risk and the certainty of catastrophic consequences. This is more a political than a technical dilemma. Will states take the risk of triggering a nuclear exchange, the consequences of which could be total annihilation? Even the idea of preventive strike against a fledgling Chinese nuclear facility was given up by Russia for fear of minimum retaliation by China on a Russian city. The Israeli strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 is, perhaps, the first strike against another country’s nuclear facilities and has never been replicated by others. Waltz expresses the view that the Israeli strike achieved nothing substantial and only increased Arab motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Basrur is highly critical of Brasstacks which he argues might have provoked Pakistan to react; a highly dangerous consequence in a nuclearised environment. With regard to Parakram in the aftermath of the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, Basrur writes that it represented a significant strategic shift in India’s nuclear policy; that of deterrence to one of compellence.8 Indian leaders took the initiative in projecting military force, backed by nuclear capabilities to coerce Pakistan into dropping its support for terrorist groups in Kashmir.9 India sought to pressurise the US into influencing Pakistan by the compellence strategy. Kargil had to an extent established the stability/instability paradox and the Pakistan military’s perception that a limited war could be fought among two nuclear powers. India’s military mobilisation during 2001-02 was an attempt to test the limited war theory in the reverse. Ever since the end of hostilities over Kargil in 1999, many in the Indian strategic community had been suggesting the possibility of stretching the elasticity of space between the Kargil-type of limited response and a nuclear conflagration. The objective was to convince Pakistan that its nuclear weapons would not deter India from responding appropriately to Pakistan’s hostile actions. The 2001-02 military buildup was preceded by diplomatic pressure by India, stopping rail and bus service to Pakistan and recalling its ambassador. The Indian Army moved if not deployed the Prithvi missile from Secunderabad to the border. Basrur argues that the whole exercise was a bluff and was obvious as such to the other side. The US would have stopped any war at that stage and that the Indian Armed Forces had neither the wherewithal nor effective plans to attack Pakistan. Compellence failed as Pakistan also resorted to nuclear signaling by deploying its Shaheen Missile on 20 May 2002. Nuclear weapons so far viewed as a political tool in India’s strategic culture was elevated to the realm of operational strategy and as a result could have had unforeseen consequences and failure of control.

Ganguly and Hagerty approach the subject from a different conceptual framework. At the beginning, they put forward three propositions for evaluating the determinants of crisis behaviour. These are: India and Pakistan were dissuaded from attacking each other due to timely and forceful US intervention; that India and Pakistan despite compelling incentives to attack each other were dissuaded from doing so due to fear that war might escalate to the nuclear level; that India and Pakistan were dissuaded from attacking each other due to lack of conventional military superiority. With regard to any consideration of preventive war, India was dissuaded from doing so in the 1984 crisis in Punjab and Brasstacks, primarily because it lacked requisite conventional military superiority.

According to Ganguly and Hagerty, during the 1986-87 crisis, Pakistan’s conventional capability was bolstered by the inflow of sophisticated weapons from the US. From 1990 onwards till Kargil 1999 and Parakram of 2001-2002, the shadow of nuclear weapons played a strong deterring role as well as US’ pro-active role as a security facilitator. By the 1990s, Pakistan had the rudiments of a nuclear weapon and the US was heavily engaged in South Asia through its involvement in Afghanistan since 1979. Placing their arguments within the three levels of analysis, the authors indicate that due to unipolarity after the end of the Cold War, the US took on the role of a “security facilitator”. After the 1998 test by India and Pakistan, the systemic had only one super power, the US, and as a result it was increasingly called upon to play the role of a balancer. Indeed, by the 1990s, the trilateral relationship between Washington, Islamabad and New Delhi constituted the core of South Asian affairs.10 Ganguly and Hagerty focuses on the grand strategy of Pakistan and India, similar to Rajgopalan’s view of grand strategy in the domestic level of analysis and conclude that despite strong domestic rhetoric in both countries against the other, preventive war as a policy option was given up as any rational actor feared the terrible consequences of retaliation.11

Survivable Second Strike Forces

Waltz believes that for deterrence to work, for a retaliatory strategy to be in place, a second strike capability is crucial. A survivable second strike capability increases the prospects of peace and nuclear stability. The very fact that an adversary could retaliate negates the attacker’s strategy of nuclear attack. Here, numbers do not matter. The US had a number advantage over the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis; likewise the Soviet also enjoyed a number advantage over China in the Ussuri river crisis of 1969. Yet, both were deterred by their opponents second strike capability even if it was limited to striking at one or two urban centres. As Brodie had famously stated, “[T]hus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose”.12 Waltz argues that survivability and second strike forces need not be in hair trigger alert. Moreover, with regard to the survivability and second strike potential of small nuclear arsenals, a few survivable second strike nuclear warheads with delivery systems are enough to deter a potential attacker. This requires a strategy of dispersed nuclear weapons. Sagan argues that nuclear dispersal, historically, means that command and control is difficult to achieve as the Soviet and US case showed. What is forgotten in such argumentation is that both the US and Soviet arsenal were massive. In comparison, the South Asian nuclear arsenal is small and easy to disperse and manageable.13 The adversary only needs to believe that some of the nuclear warheads would survive its first strike. That is reason enough for it not to strike in the first place. An element of uncertainly is crucial here. Rajgopalan also asserts that for deterrence to work, second strike capability is critical. However, he agrees with Waltz in stating that though the second strike capability is important, the strength of the second strike is not particularly significant for deterrence to work. He states that “If it is the threat of nuclear war that deters, then the threat of a second strike capability is important, and the strength of the second strike might be irrelevant”.14 In this context, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine states the first strike (as a last resort) and a second strike capability; India’s nuclear draft doctrine, on the other hand, clearly states the efficacy of credible minimum doctrine, no first use and retaliation (second strike) to a nuclear attack on Indian territory and forces.15 Basrur, Ganguly and Hagerty strongly argue that for a “minimum credible deterrent”, there must be a “guaranteed second strike”. The adversary must be convinced of the attacked state’s ability to retaliate with sufficient power and accuracy. A minimum deterrent is defined according to them in terms of “assured survivability against repeated attrition attack”. For nuclear forces to be survivable, they must be hidden, dispersed or mobile in their base. The credibility factor which is woven through Rajgopalan, Basrur, Ganguly and Hagerty arguments is what Waltz had originally envisioned. Credibility is in the realm of ones own perception, writes Waltz. Moreover, nuclear weapons are unique and hence Waltz succinctly puts it, “contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is possible focuses one’s attention not on the probability of victory, but on the possibility of deterrence, a big worry in a conventional world, disappears in a nuclear one”16 Sagan is, however, sceptical about the survivability of nuclear forces in the India-Pakistan context. Pakistan’s nuclear force deployment has a pattern that gives away its deployment locations. Indian intelligence officers had identified missile deployment during the Cold War with regard to Pakistan’s M-11 missiles.17 Both countries could also interpret messages revealing secret locations. The 1971 war reflected the ability of each side to detect messages about force positions and movements. During the Kargil conflict also, messages were intercepted.

Avoidance of Accidental Nuclear War

Another factor in nuclear stability is the avoidance of accidental wars. Sagan fears that the geographical proximity, inadequate warning systems, short flight times, rapid decapitation, terrorists bases within Pakistan, lack of Permissive Action Links (PAL) in Pakistan, alerting of nuclear weapons in crisis especially by Pakistan, intelligence akin to the joint Indian and Israeli preventive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear installations in 1998 could trigger a nuclear reaction. He also distrusts the ability of Central Commands in India and Pakistan to maintain control over their weapons. Waltz is critical of Sagan’s stand. He points out that it smacks of colonial attitudes and general mistrust of the developing world decision maker’s rationality and ability to take logical decisions. Such perceptions are not backed by evidence. Rajgopalan, Basrur, Ganguly and Hagerty are less fearful of the probable misuse of nuclear weapons in the South Asian context. Rajgopalan is of the view that unintentional use might occur due to nuclear escalation and normal military behaviour. Military commanders might use nuclear weapons from their legitimate national political authority. However, given the fact that nuclear weapons signify catastrophic consequences, the possibility of conventional conflict escalating to nuclear level is zero. The possibility of nuclear weapons used by local commanders is again improbable because nuclear weapons have not been dispersed to local commanders by both countries and are in fact under tight control of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Neither India nor Pakistan has delegative command and control structures.18 Both India and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines reduce the risk of these weapons falling to a rogue military commander as these weapons are kept in a disabled state. Nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist are rather alarmist. Pakistan has a three men safety system to activate a nuclear arsenal; moreover, the terrorist will have to know how to assemble the weapon, which is usually kept in a disabled state. It is a highly unlikely scenario. None of the weapons are kept in high trigger alert. Given the fact that these weapons are kept in separate parts, the likelihood of accidents are also low. According to Basrur, given the small size of the nuclear weapons in South Asia, securing them is not a Herculean task. Terrorist might be motivated to use natural uranium and radiation attacks but again, given the strong vigilance in place around nuclear installations, such prospects seems highly unlikely. Basrur is categorical in stating that building nuclear weapons is a very difficult task. Dirty bombs are altogether not easy as making them involves the handling of radioactive materials. However, he cautions that although a nuclear bomb would be hard to make, it is not an impossible task. As long as the will is there, the opportunities and capacities can be acquired. To counter nuclear terrorism, what is required is the technical sophistication and organisational zeal. Also, intelligence gathering means and methods should be state of the art. There has to be effective co-ordination, planning and oversight. India’s nuclear doctrine must consider the threat of nuclear terrorism. Last but not the least; Basrur indicates the importance of multilateral international cooperation to deal with this probable menace.

To summarise, the debate with regard to nuclear weapons in the South Asian context is no more about whether these weapons are a viable tool of statecraft. Rather, the debate has shifted to the realm of numbers; how many nuclear weapons should a state possess in order to establish a credible nuclear posture of deterrence? The answer which emerges from the review is not many. Neither India nor Pakistan possesses the resources or the need to enter into a nuclear arms race. A few survivable weapons with second-strike capability, however, are within these states’ finances and public support.

States co-exist in anarchy at the systemic level where the dominant rule is self help. So long as states are suspicious of each other, nuclear weapons are here to stay. And as long as this is the existential order of the day, states have to devise tactics to limit the possibility of their own destruction. Nuclear weapons bring about stability despite the fact that their existence threatens humanity with annihilation. It is important to note in the end that the Clausewitzian dictum “war is a continuation of politics by other means” is not a useful paradigm in the nuclear age. These weapons are not usable weapons but their existence is a reality that states have to learn to deal with. In a very Waltzerian sense, perhaps the threat to use nuclear weapons is much more morally defensible than their actual usage.19 Hopefully, these weapons will always remain in the domain of threats; strategic posturing and the long peace will be a reality in perpetuity.

References/End Notes

1. Bruce de Mesquita and William H. Riker, “ An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, p. 283. Also see John J Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer, 1990 pp. 5-56. Mearsheimer even predicted a more stable world if Germany, Ukraine and Japan became nuclear powers. For this view, see John Mearsheimer, “The Case for the Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 50-66. Peter Lavoy states that nuclear weapons would prevent future wars between India and Pakistan. See Scot D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed With New Sections on India and Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defence (New York: W W Norton and Company, 2003),p. 47.
2. Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 269-286 stated that nuclear deterrence works primarily because it is strategy based on bluff.
3. Sagan and Waltz, no. 1, p. 5.
4. See Waltz and Sagan, no. 1, p. 14.
5. Ibid, pp. 36-148.
6. See Rajesh Rajagopalan, Second Strike Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia, Penguin, Viking, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 20-28.
7. Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s National Security,Stanford, University Press, Stanford 2006, p. 24.
8. In deterrence, one threatens to punish the adversary when the later initiates an act of war. In compellence, one initiates the action by threatening the adversary in order to change the latter’s behaviour.
9. Rajesh M. Basrur, no. 8, p. 80.
10. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 5.
11. Grand Strategy is the overall political goals of a state and the means-use of military, diplomatic and other means to achieve that goal.
12. Bernard Brodie, “ Implications for Military Strategy”, in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 946, p. 76.
13. See Sagan and Waltz, no. 1, pp. 20-21.
14. Rajesh M. Basrur, no. 8, p. 27.
15. Ibid, pp. 78-79.
16. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities”, American Political Science Journal, 84 (3), September 1990, pp. 735-36.
17. Sagan and Waltz, no.1, pp. 101-102.
18. Rajesh M. Basrur, no.8, p. 149
19. Michael Walzer, no.2, p. 274. He states that deterrence is a way to cope with the condition of supreme emergency when states realize that their commitment to resist the use of nuclear weapons stems from the fact that a nuclear confrontation would not be the defeat of one side or the other but the total destruction of both. Deterrence is a way of coping with such a condition. He writes “Though it is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states”.

The Dark Side of the West's Global War on Terror July 2006 Ramakant Dwivedi

Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand: A British Ambassador’s Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror (Mainstream Publishing Company Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 400

Craig Murray’s study of relations between Washington, London and Tashkent is both timely and useful in furthering our understanding of the darker side of the West’s Global War on Terror. The book is a product of the author’s diplomatic experience in the highly important capital of Central Asia -Tashkent - at a very crucial period of British and American engagement in the region. Although the author’s principle focus is on the British policies, he has succeeded in critically examining the actions of his masters in London in the larger context of the war on terror. Ever since the US and its allies embarked on the war in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan has been at the centre of Western strategy in both Afghanistan and the Central Asian region. The author’s principal purpose, it appears, is to expose the hypocrisies of the Western statesmen, especially those of Blair and Bush. Murray powerfully demonstrates the gap between what Western powers preach about human rights and democracy and what they actually practice. For instance, while Bush and Blair were demonstrating their concern and commitment for the people of Iraq by bombing their country, they didn’t think anything was amiss in reinforcing the brutal regime of Islam Karimov in Tashkent. The Western allies awarded financial assistance, military and political support despite the fact that Karimov’s government did not tolerate any political opposition to its policies and put up torture chambers for opposition leaders and human rights activists.

At the core of Murray’s book rests this simple pronouncement: by turning a blind eye to Karimov’s egregious human rights violations and suppression of political dissent, both Washington and London have shied away from the very values they professed to promote – democracy, respect to human rights and a liberal economy system. In fact, the author questions the rationale of unremitting economic assistance and political support to Tashkent by Washington and London. Ostensibly, the assistance was meant to beef up Karimov’s regime in its fight to suppress the forces of religious extremism mainly Hizb-u-Tahrir (HuT) and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which is now known as Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT).

The allies’ willingness to prop up Karimov can be partly understood when placed in the context of the larger necessities of the war on terror. With religious extremism and terrorism acquiring global dimensions and the emergence of Afghanistan as the epicentre of extremism and terrorism, a global effort to fight this threat became inevitable. Such an effort needed coordination and cooperation of all the states of the region and beyond. Uzbekistan extended full support and cooperation to Operation Enduring Freedom. Since Uzbekistan was facing challenges in Ferghana Valley and in other parts of the country, Tashkent’s support was understandable. Uzbekistan also provided airbase facilities to the US at Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) which housed two full squadrons of American air force with an additional 2000 foot soldiers. K-2 played an important role in Operation Enduring Freedom. In return, Karimov’s government got financial, military and political support from Washington in promoting ‘stability and safety’ within the country.

The issue of religious extremism in Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has been undergoing radical change. However, the extent to which it has impacted varies significantly. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, Islam was historically less politically vital than elsewhere. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on the other hand, are the front line states. Both are geographically close to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their Islamic institutions are centuries old, and they have institutionalised relations that inextricably bind them to the Islamic cultures in the West and South Asia. The potential for an upsurge of extremist Islam is more likely in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than in other Central Asian Republics. In the context of changing geo-political configurations in Central Asia, the issue of ‘Religious Extremism’ gains priority. However, the author overlooks this reality, which in contrast scholars like Alexey Malashenko, Scholar-in-Residence and Program Co-chair on religion, society and security at the Moscow Center of the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, insightfully provide. Malashenko writings such as Islam in Central Asia (Garnet Publishers, U K, 1994), Islamic Factor in the Northern Caucasus (Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, 2001), Islam in the Post-Soviet Newly Independent States: The View from Within, (Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, 2001) are seminal work on the threats from religious extremists to the security of Central Asia.

Uzbekistan has been witnessing clashes between secular and extremist forces since its independence from the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991. Murray believes that political deprivation, the deteriorating economic conditions, rampant corruption, a sharp drop in living standards, mass unemployment, and failures on the part of the Uzbek government to address these problems have enabled religious extremism to prosper. One may, with important qualifications, agree with this generalisation. However, one finds it difficult to explain the ambitious agenda of Hizb e-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan in terms of socio-political-economic deprivations. These radical groups wish to resurrect an Islamic Caliphate, by undermining the secular fabric of the country and also challenging the secular constitutional system that is in place at the present. The author holds Uzbek intelligence agencies responsible for the suicide attacks in Tashkent and Bukhora during March 29–April 1, 2004 which killed 51 people and injured more than 100. However, he does not provide any convincing argument in support of his assertion. On the contrary, there is persuasive information/evidence that the protesters in Tashkent received active support and guidance from forces outside of Uzbekistan which are inimical to the present ordering of the political system. The territory of the neighbouring countries was used for planning and execution of suicide attacks in Tashkent and Bukhora. Jamoat (splinter group of HuT) was held responsible for these attacks by the Uzbek government.

Murray seeks to demonstrate the vested interests of the Karimov family in the economic and business policies of his government. The study clearly shows that the Uzbek economy is to a large degree structured to benefit Karimov’s immediate family members and close associates. The author highlights the bankruptcy of collective farm system prevalent in Uzbekistan and its negative impact on the Uzbek people. He further questions the plea put forward by the US Department of State and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for supporting and rewarding the economic reforms undertaken by Karimov government. Murray is convinced that unless the Uzbek government liberalises the economy, respects human rights and gives due space to the opposition parties and tolerate dissent, Western aid and assistance is undesirable. The author’s views are both credible and unimpeachable. Murray has been more consistent and honest than is former masters in Whitehall. It is important to note that the author took the unusual step for a diplomat, when in October 2002, he pronounced publicly on the absence of what he called a ‘functioning democracy’ in Uzbekistan. That controversial speech at the Freedom House, an American NGO, in Tashkent set him on a collision course with both London and Washington. One US diplomat in Tashkent is reported to have remarked after the event, “Murray is finished man here”.

The book, in spite, the occasional outbursts of the author, clinically provides an insight into the sheer incompetence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MI6 in assessing and managing the fragile and complicated situation in one of the most important Central Asian Republics (CARs). MI6’s overdependence and unverified reliance on CIA’s assessment and information about the various terrorists and religious extremist groups/parties/organisations active in and outside Uzbekistan is one of the primary concerns of the author. The author tried hard to convince the Central Asia section of the Eastern Department in the FCO (through numerous telegrams and diplomatic dispatches) that Uzbekistan has not moved an inch away from the Soviet legacy. The author is of the firm opinion that the US Administration in its blind effort to garner support of Muslim countries in its war on terror turned a blind eye to the worsening situation in Uzbekistan. Murray evidences his observation by citing the case of Muzaffar Avazov, who was reportedly tortured and boiled to death in August, 2001 by the security services of the Uzbek government. The book documents a series of human rights violations by the Uzbekistan security forces in Ferghana (Abdusalom Ergashev), Andijon, Namangan (Erk activists), Bukhora, Samarkand (Prof Mirsaidov whose grandson was killed after his meeting with Craig Murray and Simon Butt, a high ranking official from Eastern Department of the FCO), ji*zzak (Bakhtiyor Homroev), Kashkadarya (Atayev) and Tashkent (Muzaffar Avazov) to name some. The book’s title seems to have been drawn from the murder of Prof. Mirsaidov’s grandson. These violations were questioned by the author himself by attending trial cases in the provincial courts and advocating for the rights of ordinary citizens. He raised these matters in his meetings with the local governors and was supported by the western NGOs (Soros Foundation), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and European Union in some cases. The author emphasises that such summary trials combined with deteriorating economic conditions, increasing corruption and lack of democratic space have helped terrorism and extremism to grow and sustain. Murray’s, ambassadorial tenure is littered by his disagreements with the Eastern Department of the FCO, on large and small policy issues mainly concerning the promotion of human rights (p. 253). The book documents many of these official communications which add authenticity to the author’s claim of London’s complicity in addressing the issue of human rights.

The British intelligence, not being able to have enough human intelligence resources in Central Asia, heavily depends on US intelligence for information regarding the terrorist organisations. The author disputes the authenticity of US information which, he alleges, for sound reasons, is sourced from unreliable Uzbek sources. However, this view was neither shared nor was it convenient to his bosses in London; however correct the authors assertions may have been. The FCO dismissed it as an insignificant rumbling of a tired and frustrated diplomat. After all the partnership between the British and American intelligence agencies was time-tested and above suspicion! It is important to note here, the historical background to this arrangement. The US-UK intelligence sharing agreement was firmly cemented by the British Prime Minister Churchill and American President Roosevelt. It stipulates that the CIA and the MI6 exchange information on similar lines as the US National Security Agency and the UK General Communication Headquarters.

Adding further to the grievances of his superiors was the author’s contention that the global war on terror was not fought for either eliminating the scourge of terror or for the enlargement of freedom and democracy but for the benefit of the corrupt American Republicans greedily eyeing the advantages of controlling oil fields and boosting the weapons industries (p. 159).

Be that as it may, the book, however, fails to dwell on many important and connected issues. For example, it does not enlighten the readers about the external dynamics associated with the terrorist and extremist groups’ active in Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular. Nor does it delve into the ideological and financial supply lines of these organisations/ parties/groups. Also, the failure to draw the connection between narcotrafficking and extremist ideology is noticeably missing in the book. The author has shown a tendency to make broad generalisations which are not based on either fact or experience. Murray claims that “Observing the ritual of prayer five times per day is discouraged by government mosques, as is fasting in Ramadan…state religion does not fulfill the spiritual need of the pious” (p. 82). This seems to be an extrapolative leap from insufficient data. This Reviewer spent three years (1998-2001) in Uzbekistan and travelled extensively within the country (visited 90 districts out of 160) but did not come across any such restrictions. Murray’s plea that women in Uzbek society are still living in dreadful conditions (p. 147) draws attention to an important issue by pointing out the extremities than an a balanced statement of fact.

The book is a scathing rebuke on the “diplomatic silence” adopted by the Western powers to the corrupt and dangerous regime in Tashkent and the ease with which they are led by the nose by Karimov. The book is neither a self-presentation nor a righteousness account but a candid observation of a perceptive diplomat trying to make the higher-ups view things in the right perspective and set policy accordingly. None of the representative from European Union, EBRD, US, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), India and others took the view that there was an overriding obligation to tell the truth about the corrupt and ideologically bankrupt Uzbek government, as Craig Murray has done.

Notwithstanding some of the weaknesses, the book remains a brave attempt at chronicling the lies and half truths employed by the Western statesmen in their war on terror. Hopefully, Murray’s bold account will give courage to many more public servants to speak the truth

Million Mutinies in Pakistan's Tribal Areas June 27, 2006 Ashok K. Behuria

The tribal terrain in Pakistan is in a state of turmoil. As the Pakistani Taliban gradually emerge, many analysts have pointed out that the terrain has traditionally been home to orthodoxy over the centuries and nourished rebels like Sayiid Ahmad, Faqir of Ippi, Nek Muhammad, Abdul Mehsud and now Mullah Dadullah. The entire area stretching from the Khyber Pass till Chaman in the south across Waziristan and eastward up to Peshawar in Pakistan has remained immune to change, both because of lack of will on the part of the government to extend its writ to these areas and the unwillingness of the local people to abandon their tribal mode of existence.

While the Taliban have hit the headlines, certain other groups posing as counterfoils to the Taliban have received scant attention. In fact, the Deobandi-Barelvi dimension in the tribal belt has been comparatively understudied. The traditional intra-sectarian fault-lines among a variety of Islam-pasand groups in the Tribal Areas have erupted in recent years and are posing serious internal security challenges for Islamabad. The year-long clashes between two rival Mullah groups in Bara in the Khyber agency of Pakistan best illustrates this development.

For much of 2004 and 2005 groups like Amar Bilmaroof Wanahi Anilmunkar (ABWA) - which literally means promotion of virtue and prevention of vice - fought against the Barelvi-Pirano groups in the Khyber agency. These rival groups run their own FM radio stations and mobilise popular support through active propaganda. In fact, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) reports that there are about 62 illegal FM stations in settled areas, while 49 others operate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimates that there are 67 illegal FM radio stations operating from various seminaries and mosques controlled by local Mullahs in Upper and Lower Dir, Swat, Malakand, Buner, Shangla and Swabi, Bara, Wari, Usheri Darra, Jabar and Barawal Banday.

Since it is very cheap to establish a radio station (about ten to fifteen thousand rupees), it has been difficult to effectively stop the practice. Super-orthodox Mullahs have found these radio centres convenient tools to air their views on the Quran (Dars-i-Quran) and have, through their sermons, poured venom against one another, provoking armed encounters among these groups, sometimes within the separate khels (sub-tribes) of the same tribe. This has disturbed the peace of the area and baffled the Pakistani security establishment.

The most recent case involves a tussle between Mufti Shakir and Pir Saifur Rahman at Bara, a few kilometres from Peshawar in Khyber agency. In 2004, the two Maulanas had established separate FM stations and their sermons began to progressively assume intense sectarian contours. By September 2005, the verbal duel between the Maulanas over the FM radio transmissions had crossed the limits of civility.

Pir Saif hails from Samangan province of Afghanistan and had settled down in Bara Tehsil. He is one of the many Pirs who had shifted to Pakistan during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Mufti Shakir is a Khattak and hails from Karak district of the NWFP. He first shifted to Sadda Tehsil of Kurram agency, where his involvement in Shia-Sunni sectarian riots led to his expulsion by the authorities. He then migrated to Bara and settled down there.

It is interesting to note that the two Mullahs were co-mujahids in the Afghan jihad. However, the commonality between them ends there. Mufti Shakir is unabashedly Deobandi in his viewpoint, while Pir Saifur is a Barelvi. Shakir has majority Afridis as his followers, while Pir has a substantial following among some Afridi khels. The Pir's influence, however, extends into Punjab, NWFP and Karachi where he has a sizable following among the subalterns in the Pakistani army as well as bureaucrats in the civil administration. Reports reveal that on the 9th day of the 10th month of the Islamic calendar (Shawal), the Pir used to hold his durbar in Bara and more than 150,000 followers used to attend this.

Coming back to the tussle at Bara, Mufti Shakir claimed that the Pir had been promoting a perverted version of Islam and in the true tradition of the religion such vice had to be prevented. After preaching continuously against the Pir, he asked the latter to leave Bara by December 25, 2005. The Mufti even formed a militant outfit called Lashkar-i-Islam to impose a Taliban style religious code in the area. His principal follower, Mangal Bagh, who claimed to be the amir of Lashkar-i-Islam, set upon himself the task of realising the dreams of his mentor by force and issued warnings to the Pir to move out of Bara. But the Pir refused to oblige. To prevent the situation from spiralling out of control, Pakistani authorities had to send in more than 1,000 troops from Bajaur Scouts, Mohmand Rifles, Mehsud Scouts and Khyber Rifles to maintain order.

On January 31, 2006, the Khyber administration organised a jirga of Afridi sub-tribes to discuss the matter. The jirga decided to expel the Maulanas as they were not locals and had aggravated the security situation in Bara. The Pir obeyed the verdict and left Bara on February 1, reportedly for Lahore. Mufti Shakir, however, interpreted the Pir's exit as a grand victory and refused to leave Bara for quite some days. Finally, upon pressure from the administration, he too left towards the end of February reportedly for Tirah valley, where the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry is peaking now. Subsequently, the jirga entrusted the task of maintaining security of the area to a tribal peacekeeping force, Tanzeem-e-Ittehad Ulema.

But the sectarian temperature in the area refused to subside even after this. The Tanzeem faced serious attacks from Lashkar-i-Islami in early March 2006. On March 25, Lashkar followers led by Mangal destroyed the house of one of the Pir's followers. And on March 28, they attacked the house of the Pir's principal follower, Badshah Khan, and killed 19 supporters of the Pir, 16 of whom were Afghan nationals, and carried away women and children as hostage.

The administration's response was quick. After one shot from the Frontier Corps aimed at the Mufti's headquarters in Nullah Khajori, which destroyed the antenna of the FM station on March 30, Mangal reportedly fled to Gugrini area on the hills near Jamrud to hide in the caves there. He re-launched his radio station and started spewing venom against the Barelvi-Pirano group. In true Taliban tradition, he urged men in the area to pray five times a day, grow beards and refrain from collaborating with the political authorities. He also imposed a ban on the interest-based loan system, declaring it un-Islamic.

The efforts of the administration and the jirga to bring moderation into Mangal Bagh do not seem to have had any effect. By early May 2006, he was threatening the local administration that all routes to Tirah would be blocked, if his supporters, apprehended in April, were not released. He even persuaded the elders of the Zakhakhels - the largest sub-tribe among the Afridis - not to participate in the jirga in May. At the beginning of June, Mangal's men kidnapped a local Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam leader from a mosque for allegedly cooperating with the administration. The Lashkar took control of the Bara bazaar on June 10. The administration responded on June 12 by blowing up of a four-storey shopping plaza owned by Mangal. The Khasadar force and Mehsood Scouts have since taken up the Bara bazaar under their control. But Mangal continues to remain defiant.

This episode in Bara epitomises Pakistan's policy towards the local Taliban. The process of engendering sectarian hatred has been left untouched and the state has exhibited a sense of reluctance to rein in the Deobandi-Taliban elements, unless they become violent and challenge the writ of the state. Some analysts in Pakistan would argue that this is mainly because the administration is traditionally known for its sympathies towards such a puritanical viewpoint. The Barelvi viewpoint, which could perhaps provide a counter-force, stands marginalised. The authorities have also not tapped the new generation of local leadership, which wishes to get out of the tribal mould and mainstream itself. Instead, they have allowed the Deobandi strain to dominate the terrain, hoping to quarantine its influence in the tribal belt and buy peace in the bargain. However, the administration has ignored the inability of such groups to remain quiet and non-coercive. These groups have moreover repeatedly challenged the might of the state. In the absence of an imaginative plan to counter such an assertive ideology at the grassroots level, Pakistan will continue to labour under a million mutinies, which will increasingly weaken the capacity of the state in the days to come.

South Asia Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), Pakistan, Taliban ULFA's Pressure Tactics June 27, 2006 Namrata Goswami

In the third round of talks held in New Delhi on June 22 with the 11-member People's Consultative Group (PCG), the Centre gave an assurance that it would engage with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) directly within a fixed time frame. Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, who represented the Centre, also told the PCG that their demand to release ULFA Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi, Cultural Secretary Pranati Deka, Publicity Secretary Mithinga Daimary, Executive Committee Member Ramu Mech and Ideologue Bhimakanta Buragohain would be considered in consultation with the Assam Government. The Home Minister also urged the PCG to impress upon the ULFA to sincerely work towards the establishment of a peaceful environment to facilitate direct talks at the earliest. At the end of the three-hour long engagement, the two sides issued a joint statement expressing the hope that they would base their future action on restraint. The PCG expressed satisfaction at the Home Minister's vision for a negotiated settlement with Assam's largest separatist group, and promised that it would appeal to the ULFA to adopt peaceful methods and in the process create a secure and stable environment in Assam conducive for direct peace negotiations.

But the positive effect that the third round of talks was meant to reflect and the pathway paved for direct negotiations were negated to a large extent by the spate of bombings in Assam that preceded the talks. Explosions occurred in Haibargaon, Golakganj, Dhubri and Mangaldoi on June 8 injuring 28 people. A wave of bomb blasts was triggered off in Guwahati and Naharkatiya on June 9 and 10. A grenade was thrown in a politician's house in Naharkatia and oil and gas pipelines were also blown up. Significantly, the ULFA owned up only to the attack on oil installations. The Guwahati bomb blasts in the crowded wholesale vegetable market of Machkhowa killed six people and injured at least 20. On June 11, suspected ULFA militants blew up railway tracks with a remote controlled bomb between Borhat and Sapekhati in Sivasagar district and attacked a police party at Makum in Tinsukia district injuring two policemen and a civilian. On June 12, a bomb blast in the oil town of Digboi killed one person and injured 12 others.

Reacting to the violence, Home Secretary V K Duggal said, "ULFA is adopting tactics to pressure the Centre. These are tactics we understand and we can reply to them…these are not good tactics." The ULFA was quick to deny any hand in or knowledge of the attacks and its chief Paresh Barua stated, "those who want peace dialogue in Assam scuttled are using mercenaries to stage such attacks so that we can be blamed." In contrast, the Assam Police (AP) asserted that the scheme and tactics involved in the bombings clearly indicated the hand of the ULFA. The pattern of the attacks had a strong resemblance to earlier such attacks by the group. Inspector General of Police (Special Branch) Khagen Sharma insisted on June 9 that "though there is no evidence yet that the ULFA was involved, the needle of suspicion points to them." He went on to state in a press conference on June 14 in Guwahati that similar bomb attacks have been on the rise since 2004, when a 16-member team trained in using explosives and bombs in Batrossi Hills of Mansera district in Pakistan clandestinely crossed the border into Assam with the help of Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence. But the ULFA, in an email put out by Paresh Barua, blamed the AP of engineering the latest attacks in order to stall the June 22 peace talks with the Centre. But this, by any account, seemed like a fictitious claim dished out by the ULFA leaders to steer the spotlight away from the outfit in the immediate aftermath of the bombings.

A cursory glance at the ULFA's spate of violence in recent years indicates that it has been involved in the killing of innocent civilians - a principal reason for its loss of support among the Assamese people. On July 1, 1991, it was involved in the kidnapping of a Russian mining engineer and 14 Indian nationals; the Russian and several of the Indians were later killed in captivity. The group was indicted in the kidnapping and murder of social activist Sanjay Ghosh in 1997, which provoked international condemnation. But the most dastardly attack carried out by the ULFA was the Dhemaji bombings of August 15, 2004 in which several school children were killed. In a subsequent email statement, ULFA's chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, claimed that though unfortunate the school children had been used as a shield by the Indian occupation forces to defy the outfit's boycott call of Independence Day celebrations. This was the first public acceptance of "terror bombing" tactics by the ULFA.

The ULFA's latest bombings raises the question of the outfit's commitment to peace. Its terror tactics could be viewed as an attempt to demonstrate its ability to strike and kill in the wake of reports in the Assamese press about its waning influence in the state. ULFA chief Paresh Barua, in a statement on June 10, had threatened four journalists including the editor of The Sentinel D N Bezboruah for exposing the outfit's eroding support base. Given this, the Centre should have postponed the June 22 talks with the PCG. Moreover, the Centre's willingness to hold direct talks with the ULFA, despite its suspected hand in the recent bomb blasts, could set a dangerous precedent. Similar violent acts could be engineered by other militant groups in the Northeast, primarily aimed at increasing stakes in the political gamble of power sharing.

Interestingly, the ULFA was distinctively silent during the Assam elections earlier this year. The Assamese perceive the ULFA as an aging force, whose earlier euphoric declaration of a Swadin Asom or Independent Assam lost much of its shine after its linkages with the illegal Bangladeshi migrant community came to light. The outfit is also suspected of maintaining bases in Bangladesh. The people of Assam have come to look upon the ULFA as interest-driven, wanting to capitalize on its earlier "sanctified" image of fighting for Assam's liberation for its own economic and political ends. It no longer captures the imagination of the masses. But it is important to engage the group and extract a commitment of cease-fire from it. Willy-nilly, given its loss of popular support, it has no other option but to resort to peace initiatives with the Centre.

The peace process, which was kick started in October 2005, is a step in the right direction. An outfit, towards the fa*g end of its existence, could "up the ante" with violent demonstrations to project power. More importantly, the recent violence is also indicative of the outfit's inability to control its cadres. That is reason enough for the Centre and the ULFA to work out the modalities of a ceasefire. But the Centre must be wary of not succumbing to pressure tactics by the group. The road to peace in the state has taken its first tentative steps and is a welcome development.

Terrorism & Internal Security Assam, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) Sri Lanka's Uncertain Future June 27, 2006 M. Mayilvaganan

Sri Lanka, which seemed all set to move towards peace and ethnic reconciliation, teeters on the brink of a grim crisis today. In an almost incredible turn of events, the forces of peace and progressive change appear exhausted and there is a sharp rise in tensions and uncertainty. The nagging feeling is growing externally and among the Sri Lankan liberal intelligentsia that yet another round of ethnic confrontation may break out soon. If this happens, it would put the island nation onto the path of an uncertain future.

The much acclaimed and hoped for peace process began with the February 2002 cease-fire, which created an overwhelming desire for peace among Sri Lanka's long-suffering people. External actors, particularly Norway, have played an important role in building the peace process in Sri Lanka so far. Besides, India and the international community's support have also added strength to the peace process and helped in sustaining peace. The current peace process is the most effective confidence building measure so far between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government in the almost two decade-long search for a solution to the island's protracted crisis. However, several developments and trends have led to the present dangerous conjuncture in Sri Lanka. Among them are: the recent killing of the Sri Lankan Army's Deputy Chief of Army, Maj. Gen. Parami Kulatunga; a powerful claymore explosion in north-central Anuradhapura district that killed sixty-four civilians and the consequent deterrent strike by the Sri Lankan security forces on Sampur and Mullaitivu; the failure of the proposed meeting between representatives of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE at Oslo; and increasing violence in the eastern province. In addition, the functioning of non-LTTE entities, with the alleged support of the Sri Lankan government, has led to growing uncertainty in the northeast.

The continuing ethnic hostility between the Sinhalese and the Tamils over the last five decades continues to threaten all efforts for peace and social harmony in Sri Lanka. Clearly, the armed conflict since 1983 has proved socially destabilising, militarily crippling and economically ruinous for the island nation. Large-scale displacement, along with the crumbling of the economy, the social fabric and culture has weakened the Sri Lankan state. The National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an NGO, estimates that the approximate cost of the war is a staggering 2,451 billion Sri Lankan rupees, in addition to the approximately 65,000 people killed and about 1.2 million displaced. Yet, there are no positive signs that Sri Lanka is on the road to lasting peace and economic progress.

The only way to arrest this deterioration is to seek a negotiated peace. If the government and the LTTE genuinely opt for peaceful negotiations, there is every chance that a worthwhile agreement, short of separation, could result. Norway is already engaged in preparatory work for further negotiations, in spite of the failure of the Oslo talks and the EU ban. But it has to be seen as to how the government and the Tigers utilise the mediation, in view of the lack of mutual trust and the LTTE's growing suspicions over the role of some EU members as ceasefire monitors. However, the general expectation is that the talks should resume without delay.

In this regard, unless there is a constructive transformation of attitudes and approaches between the major protagonists, durable peace will remain elusive. Past events have demonstrated that the parties that can play a crucial role in resolving the conflict are the UNFA government, the UNP opposition and the LTTE. The political parties, especially SLFP and UNP, have to work unitedly to achieve a consensus political solution to the ethnic problem, but unfortunately have not yet been able to agree on a particular solution. Likewise, the government has to deal firmly with the Sinhala hardliners like the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), irrespective of its political alliance and support.

While the Tigers may have the strength and stamina to continue the struggle, the ordinary people, especially in the northeast, have reached breaking point. Hence, the LTTE has to ensure that it adheres to the ceasefire agreement. Moreover, it has to show its commitment to the peace process in finding an amicable solution, while keeping the aspirations of Tamils in mind.

Nevertheless, the big question centres on what President Mahinda Rajapakse proposes to do regarding the resolution of the ethnic crisis? Considering the past realities, the question arises whether the Sri Lankan government under President Mahinda Rajapakse is really interested in finding a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict. It remains to be seen whether the strong backing of the international community would push the government and the Sinhalese to enter into talks with the LTTE. Whatever be the government policy on the Tamil's question, concrete action on the ground is necessary to pursue the desired peace goals. Certain vital decisions have to be taken by both the parties. First and foremost, the government has to come out with its decision on the LTTE's proposal of Interim-Self Governing Administration (ISGA). Secondly, the LTTE has to decide whether to stick to its earlier ISGA proposal or to abandon or dilute it. Thirdly, President Rajapakse has to decide whether to disregard the Sinhala hardliners or seek to satisfy them.

Whichever course the parties choose, one thing is certain. The phase of hope and change inaugurated in the stalled peace process is 'now past' and Sri Lanka has entered a contentious phase. If political polarisation accelerates and the ethnic conflict gets aggravated, Sri Lanka will plunge deeper into turmoil and strife.

South Asia Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka Energy Transition: Strategic Necessity for India June 26, 2006 Nandakumar Janardhanan

After his landmark speech on energy independence on the eve of India's 59th Independence Day, President Abdul Kalam emphasised upon the importance of alternative fuel development to surmount the growing challenges to energy security in his opening address at the Bio-Diesel Conference on June 9, 2006. His emphasis on energy independence places immense importance on India's energy security, as the country is increasingly dependent on imported fuels. Kalam's speech focused on the importance of biofuel development in India as a means to address the challenges to liquid fuel demand against the backdrop of resource degradation of, and supply challenges to, traditional fuels. Today, India's energy mix is dominated by coal, followed by oil and natural gas. As petroleum sources increasingly become dearer and the usage of other traditional sources such as coal and biomass burdens the environment and human health, transition to renewable and alternative sources evince greater prospects in the search for energy independence. Energy transition does not mean a complete shift to non-traditional sources and ignoring the present pattern of fuel dependency, but is largely meant to address the growing demand for generation of heat energy, electricity and liquid fuel.

Despite many technological and economic limitations, experimental and small-scale commercial production of non-traditional sources in India has seen remarkable achievements over the past few years. While renewable energy is expected to contribute a 10 per cent share to total electricity production by 2012, biofuels have already made a promising start by replacing petroleum fuels in many of the experimental transportation operations and in some commercial usages. In this context the President emphasised that since the country has 30 million hectares of usable wasteland out of the total 60 million, our aim should be to produce a minimum of 2 tonnes of bio-diesel per year per hectare, which will result in the production of 60 million tons (mt) per year in full capacity in an optimistic environment.

While traditional approaches seek to define energy security as the supply security of imported petroleum fuels, in a realistic approach, it by and large indicates the supply security of various fuel types at an affordable price in order to run the economic engine of a country. According to the President, our target is to achieve energy security by 2020, leading to energy independence by 2030 and beyond. In other words, energy security will be achieved by a combination of various supply sources and subsequently external supply of fuels can be substantially reduced or replaced by domestic production. But, with a production of 60 mt biodiesel a year by 2030, the plan to achieve energy independence appears unachievable given that demand for liquid fuel is expected to increase from 119 mt in 2004 to above 271 mt in 2030.

Since India's available oil reserves are expected to last only for 18.5 years at the current rate of crude oil production, energy independence cannot be achieved unless the country finds some major new oil reserve or increases the expected production of biodiesel to meet the demand. Moreover, in India, import dependency on oil amounts to above 70 per cent of the total consumption, which would make it difficult to manage without external supply of liquid fuels. If this trend continues, by 2030 India would end up importing almost 100 per cent of liquid fuel demand. Given the above-mentioned challenges, complete energy independence appears to be an ambitious plan for the country, though self-sufficiency in supplying a certain percentage of energy requirements, i.e. the annual growth in demand, can still be considered a possible option.

Be that as it may, according to the British Petroleum Company Limited, India's oil consumption in the year 2005 witnessed a 3.5 per cent fall compared to the consumption in 2004. This decrease is due to growing energy prices worldwide. But in the long term, we cannot expect this trend to continue due to the possible increase in demand from various sectors. Hence, it appears to be the ripe time for development of biofuels in order to supplement demand growth with a certain percentage of supply.

While biofuels might not play an exclusive role in achieving energy independence, transition from traditional sources to a mix of renewable, biodiesel, ethanol, liquefaction of coal, coal bed methane and gas hydrates together would have a strategic role in this regard. According to the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons (DGH), India has enormous potential in coal bed methane and gas hydrates reserves. The total prognosticated gas available from the gas hydrate deposits is placed at 1894 trillion cubic meters, while the current estimated gas reserves in India amount to only 1.10 trillion cubic meters (38.9 trillion cubic feet). Though gas hydrate exploration is at present limited to experimental levels, even a small percentage of commercial extraction could possibly minimise India's concerns about fuel supplies for the transportation sector.

As the crude oil import bill of the country has reached US$38.77 billion (Rs 171,702 crore) in the year 2005-2006, import dependency would place a larger economic burden in coming years. In this context, transition to non-traditional sources would become critical in substantially reducing import dependency and thereby minimising the energy import bill. Achieving energy independence by 2030 can be a pragmatic plan, provided energy transition is encouraged in both commercial and non-commercial sectors and also made economically viable.

Today, the major obstacles to energy transition include the lack of sufficient technology to explore various types of alternative and renewable sources, the lack of sufficient investment, concerns about relatively high capital cost and production cost of energy transition, and lastly optimism about a fall in oil prices in the policy making circles. Despite these factors energy transition is increasingly becoming a strategic necessity as availability, accessibility and affordability of imported fuels have been significantly affected by various external challenges.

Energy transition will not only secure fuel supply but also help the country address another important challenge to development - unemployment. The President also noted that the employment generation potential of biofuels would help empower farmers economically in India's rural areas. Energy transition could be a slower process than expected now, but is a critical step towards energy independence and economic development of our country.

Non-Traditional Security India, Renewable Energy, Energy Security